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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2538th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 11 May 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Oleg A. TROYANOVSKY
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2538)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:
   Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

The meeting was called to order at 11.30 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:
Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

1. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: In accordance with the decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2531st to 2537th meetings*], I invite the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to take places at the Council table; I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, the German Democratic Republic, Guyana, Hungary, Jamaica, Mongolia, Panama, Saint Lucia, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece), and Mr. Kirca (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. Jacobs (Antigua and Barbuda), Mr. Woolcott (Australia), Mr. Wasiuddin (Bangladesh), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Zumbado Jiménez (Costa Rica), Mr. Roa Kourí (Cuba), Mr. Albornoz (Ecuador), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. Karran (Guyana), Mr. Rácz (Hungary), Mr. Carr (Jamaica), Mr. Erdenechuluun (Mongolia), Mrs. Noriega (Panama), Mr. St. Aimee (Saint Lucia), Mr. Wijewardane (Sri Lanka), Mr. Al-Atassi (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Le Kim Chung (Viet Nam) and Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Malaysia in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. César (Czechoslovakia) and Mr. Zain (Malaysia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The Security Council will now resume its consideration of the item on its agenda. I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the following documents: S/16547, containing a letter dated 9 May 1984 from the representative of Vanuatu to the President of the Security Council, and S/16549, containing a letter dated 10 May from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General.

4. The first speaker is the representative of Malaysia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

5. Mr. ZAIN (Malaysia): Mr. President, I am grateful to you and to the other members of the Security Council for your courtesy in acceding to my request to participate in this debate on the situation in Cyprus. I am particularly gratified to do so, Sir, when a diplomat of your exceptional professionalism and wide experience —and, may I add, of your graciousness and personal charm—is presiding over our deliberations.

6. For reasons which are perhaps obvious and which I need not elaborate, my Government, as a non-member of the Security Council, is normally reluctant to

seek leave to address the Council. However, we have done so on this occasion for two essential reasons: first, because we believe—as indeed President Kyprianou has stated before the Council [*2531st meeting*]—that current developments in Cyprus are so critical that the very existence of a sovereign, independent and united Cyprus is at stake; and, secondly, because we want to express our urgent conviction that unless the Council takes a scrupulously fair and even-minded approach which deals with the problem of Cyprus in all its aspects —its historical context, its bi-national character, its independence born of international agreements and a protracted and difficult liberation struggle, as well as fundamental principles relating to the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of States—it is difficult to see how it can contribute to arresting the dangerous and apparently inexorable developments which are taking place in Cyprus today.

7. The debate on Cyprus has engaged the Council's attention for at least 20 years, and I recognize that it is difficult for a delegation to make any statement which will not be immediately interpreted as being for or against one side or the other in the unfortunate tragedy that has befallen the people of Cyprus—all the people, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot alike. Perhaps a statement equally disliked by both sides is the best we can hope for. Be that as it may, I should like to begin this attempt to make what my delegation hopes is a constructive contribution to the present debate by recalling part of a statement which my Government made on 21 November 1983 in the light of serious developments in Cyprus at that time:

> "Malaysia does not favour any move that would lead to the dismemberment of a sovereign nation. In respect of Cyprus, Malaysia has supported and will continue to support the equality of rights and the legitimate demands of the Turkish Cypriot community as co-partners with the Greek Cypriot community within the framework of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus."

8. That remains our position because we see no peaceful alternative to preventing the situation from inching gradually but inexorably in a direction which both parties, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot alike, have categorically stated they wish to avoid. If one sees a glimmer of hope at all in the deepening gloom, it is surely this one common element, this commitment to a sovereign reunited Cyprus, which has been expressed with such sober dignity by President Kyprianou, a dignity which perhaps underlines his commitment all the more, and with such passionate eloquence by Mr. Denktaş. It is this common element that we should all contribute to building upon.

9. Now I also recognize that with the events and the debates which have taken place over the last 20 years it is not easy for the immediate protagonists, and even for their friends, to restrain their sense of outrage at one development or another, to resist selective quotation from one document or another, or to avoid stressing the primacy of one principle over another, whichever suits their purposes better. All this is understandable, but in these critical times for Cyprus—and I echo again the sobering warning of President Kyprianou—we must all make a supreme effort, for the sake of all Cypriots, to eschew emotions and debating-points, to avoid casting blame or aspersions and to deal not with symptoms but with the fundamental causes of the problem which has bedevilled the international community and which has caused untold tragedy to the people of Cyprus for so long.

10. The international community, if it is to be successful, must now do its utmost to bridge the gap of the mistrust and suspicion which plague the two communities in Cyprus and to adopt an even-handed and impartial approach which recognizes that fundamental principles relating to the sovereignty of States and to the inviolability of national territory must be applied in the particular context of Cyprus, which all must admit —and indeed which all have admitted in one way or another—is *sui generis* in character. If the special character of the leadership of Mr. Denktaş and the special position of the Turkish Cypriots have not in fact been recognized—if, in other words, the situation in Cyprus is not *sui generis*—how can the General Assembly, to quote only from paragraph 10 of resolution 37/253 of 13 May 1983, which echoes previous resolutions, call for

> "negotiations between the representatives of the two communities, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to be conducted freely and on an equal footing, on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions and the high-level agreements, with a view to reaching as early as possible a mutually acceptable agreement based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two communities"?

11. But of course, part of the art of diplomacy consists in being able to hold two or more mutually contradictory ideas at the same time. By all means let us continue to do so; my only plea is that we should give both equal weight.

12. For its part, Malaysia will do what it can to promote a spirit of conciliation and to contribute to the search for a peaceful and just solution which is acceptable to the conflicting parties. In this enterprise the role of the Secretary-General is crucial. That, indeed, is the other common element which has run through all the statements which have been made in the Council. My delegation is particularly pleased to note that the Secretary-General, in his latest report to the Security Council [*S/16519*], has stated his readiness to discharge his mission of good offices and to maintain a continued process of communication and negotiation. He has added, in paragraph 23, the significant qualification that he will do so "as long as there is unambiguous support for it".

13. We believe such support has already been manifested in the Council, which is a tribute, surely, as much to the high regard in which he is held as to his exceptionally sensitive diplomatic skills, which have enabled him to succeed, despite the recent setbacks, in moving forward the dialogue in Cyprus in very difficult circumstances. But it is unfair to the Secretary-General and to his high office merely to express general support for his efforts. The Council must assist by providing the right atmosphere and the proper conditions in which intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General—the only way to bring about peace and harmony in Cyprus—can go forward. To do otherwise, to do more of the same, to look at or, worse, to condemn specific events in isolation outside the context of the complex situation of Cyprus is to court disaster: no one party should feel itself vanquished or victor after this debate.

14. That is why my delegation urges the Security Council to adopt a truly impartial, constructive and helpful resolution acceptable to both parties, which is denuded of rancour and partiality and which recognizes the realities and complexities of the specific situation of Cyprus, as well as the general principles at stake. That is why my Government, which has grave forebodings about developments in Cyprus, has taken the liberty of seeking to appear before the Council, for which opportunity I again thank you, Sir, and the other members of the Council.

15. Mr. van der STOEL (Netherlands): May I first congratulate you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Council for the month of May. Your great diplomatic skills and wide experience are well known to all of us. I also want to express our appreciation of the impeccable way Mr. Kravets of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic performed his duties as President of the Council last month.

16. We have listened with great attention to the previous speakers in this debate. We share the serious concern expressed by almost all about recent developments, which have led to a new deadlock in the search for a just and lasting peace in Cyprus and which have made it necessary for the Council once again to consider the situation in that troubled island. We deeply regret the recent exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as well as other recent actions by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in defiance of Security Council resolution 541 (1983), which, *inter alia*, considers the declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November last year as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal. At the same time, this resolution calls on all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation.

17. The Council should not forget, however, that these immediate events are not the only violation of the Constitution of Cyprus of 1960. The Netherlands has always held the view that the settlement of the Cyprus problem should be reached through negotiations on an equal footing between the representatives of the two communities and should guarantee the unity and integrity of Cyprus. The mission of good offices of the Secretary-General to further these aims has always enjoyed the full support of my Government.

18. The recent developments are even more regrettable in that they have come at a time when the Secretary-General has presented to both communities important new suggestions for the resumption of the intercommunal dialogue on the basis of a five-point scenario, which has been outlined in paragraph 14 of his latest report to the Council [*ibid.*]. In our opinion, the Secretary-General is to be commended for having proposed a scenario that should have been accepted by the leaders of both communities as the principal framework for the resumption of their intercommunal talks.

19. The scenario would have committed both communities to refrain from activities that could only further undermine the necessary bases of trust and confidence, without which a peaceful dialogue will remain elusive. The Cypriot Government would have been committed not to take steps further to internationalize the Cyprus problem, in exchange for a commitment by the Turkish Cypriot authorities that there would be no follow-up to the 15 November declaration of independence. These mutual commitments, which the Secretary-General has been seeking from the parties, would have been fully in accordance with the previous high-level agreements of 1977, between President Makarios and the leader of the Turkish community, Mr. Denktaş [*see S/12323, para. 5*], and 1979, between President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktaş [*see S/13369, para. 51*].

20. One element of the so-called 10-point agreement of May 1979 [*ibid.*] deserves quoting in full:

> "6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions."

As an initial practical measure to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, the Secretary-General has also proposed in his scenario the phased transfer of the Varosha area to the United Nations. It should be noted again that he did not suggest anything new but only tried to put forward a concrete proposal finally to implement point 5 of the high-level agreement of May 1979, in which Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktaş agreed to give priority to

> "reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and the territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached, it will be implemented

without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects".

I therefore conclude that the Secretary-General has tried to revitalize the intercommunal talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities within the framework of the good offices mission entrusted to him by the Security Council and on the basis of the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979.

21. The Secretary-General's scenario has so far failed to materialize. In paragraph 23 of his report he remarked, "The developments outlined in this report speak for themselves." They do indeed. We regret that the Turkish Cypriot authorities have deemed it necessary to pursue their declaration of independence even further at a time when the Secretary-General had requested them not to continue their activities, as part of his comprehensive proposal to revitalize the intercommunal dialogue. These activities not only contravene Security Council resolution 541 (1983), but are also difficult to reconcile with the provisions of the 10-point agreement quoted above, on which the Secretary-General has based his patient and dedicated efforts to revitalize the intercommunal talks.

22. We note that Mr. Denktaş has reaffirmed during this debate that he is still ready to resume the intercommunal talks. His statements seem to indicate that the Turkish Cypriot community continues to adhere to the concept of a united Cyprus within a bi-communal, bizonal and federal framework, as provided for by the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements. We sincerely hope these words will be translated into facts.

23. Many speakers have already pointed out that the Secretary-General's mission of good offices remains indispensable and deserves the unambiguous and unanimous support of the Security Council and of the parties directly concerned. We wholeheartedly agree and are grateful to the Secretary-General for his readiness to continue his mission, in spite of the present setback, as long as there is unambiguous support for it. The Secretary-General has also rightly drawn our attention to another essential requirement—the continued deployment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) whose presence is more than ever indispensable in the present situation.

24. The Netherlands, for its part, will extend its full co-operation to any constructive effort by the Council that would strengthen the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and provide it with the necessary political support. After the recent events, the Council is in our opinion duty-bound to reaffirm forcefully its principled rejection of the unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Given the history of Cyprus, which has been bedevilled by lack of trust on both sides, which has been manifested again in the current debate, it will not be easy for the Council to agree on a constructive course of action that will enhance the prospects of peace instead of stirring up again the flames of animosity and distrust. We should, however, be shirking a major responsibility under the Charter if we did not at least try again to promote conciliation, understanding, confidence and trust between the two Cypriot communities, thereby reviving hopes for a peaceful and just solution to the Cyprus problem.

25. Mr. de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France) [*interpretation from French*]: As this is my first statement to the Council this month, I pay tribute, on your assumption of the presidency, Sir, to your distinguished qualities as a diplomat, based on long experience in international life. We are sure that under your leadership our debate will be conducted with competence and courtesy. We all admire the remarkable ease with which you assume your tasks, and we appreciate your charm and humour, which you often use to calm down our debates when they are in danger of straying from the point. I also pay tribute, Sir, to your predecessor, Mr. Kravets, who presided so diligently over our work last month.

26. When I spoke in the Council on 18 November 1983 [*2500th meeting*], I unreservedly condemned on behalf of my country the serious violation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty, unity and independence of Cyprus represented by the declaration of independence of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. France naturally voted in favour of resolution 541 (1983).

27. Today France deplores the fact that despite the provisions of that resolution the Turkish Government has decided to establish diplomatic relations with that so-called Republic.

28. My country cannot accept these *faits accomplis*. We would equally condemn the carrying out of the recent threats to take other comparable initiatives. Such measures would be contrary to Security Council resolutions and would further hinder the search for a peaceful solution.

29. France has always regarded the Government of President Kyprianou as the sole legitimate Government of the Republic of Cyprus and has always believed that any solution to the present crisis must of necessity include respect for the unity, integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Republic and imply the withdrawal of foreign occupation forces. That is why on 13 May 1983 my delegation voted for General Assembly resolution 37/253, whose principles are still valid.

30. France agrees with the conclusion of the Secretary-General's report in document S/16519. We desire more strongly than ever that his mission of good offices should continue, for we believe that this is the only way for the parties to resume the necessary dialogue, without which no solution is possible.

31. The Secretary-General's efforts have resulted in a series of constructive proposals which have been put to

the parties. At one point the proposals aroused hopes. It is to be regretted that certain subsequent actions have jeopardized this promising process. We therefore feel that the Secretary-General's efforts must be resumed. In this connection, France would particularly favour the idea of transferring the Famagusta area to interim administration by the United Nations, which was one of the central points in the recent negotiations. Such a transfer would be a concrete manifestation of the good will which is required in any negotiations.

32. Furthermore, my country thinks it particularly necessary, in order to prevent a further deterioration of the situation, to continue the presence of UNFICYP, whose mandate will soon expire.

33. The international community would be unable to comprehend the increasingly clear separation of two communities obliged by geography and by history to get on together. For its part, France must express its hope for a just and lasting settlement strictly respecting Security Council resolutions and the principles of the Charter.

34. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The next speaker is the representative of Czechoslovakia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

35. Mr. CÉSAR (Czechoslovakia): First of all, Sir, I should like to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. My delegation is convinced that, under the guidance of a seasoned diplomat whose wisdom is well known and who represents a country and a people with which my own country and people maintain traditional relations of friendship and co-operation, the Council's work will come to a successful conclusion. Also, we wish to thank you and, through you, the other members of the Council for having granted our request to participate in the current discussion of the item on the agenda. I should like also to express our gratitude to your predecessor, the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mr. Kravets, who so effectively and clearly organized the work of the Council in April.

36. The development of the problem of Cyprus in the last six months is generating serious concern in Czechoslovakia. During this time the apprehensions that were voiced in the Security Council last November in connection with the proclamation of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus proved to be justified. Council resolution 541 (1983), adopted at the conclusion of those meetings, showed the way to resolving the difficult problem justly and in accordance with international law.

37. The international community has, however, been dismayed by the course of events. This is apparent also at the present Council meetings. This disappointment is caused by the fact that, instead of meeting the provisions of resolution 541 (1983), the Turkish side is deliberately acting against the spirit and the letter of that resolution. We have in mind, for example, the exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot administration, the drafting of a constitution for the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the preparations for a referendum on that issue. This approach creates further and even more insurmountable obstacles, blocking the way to achieving a just and lasting settlement of the problem.

38. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic does not judge the development of events in Cyprus in isolation from the overall heightening of international tension caused by the forces of aggression, which pursue a policy of force, of diktat and of interfering in the internal affairs and violating the independence and sovereignty of other States. These aggressive forces are trying to turn to their advantage any complications arising in relations between States or peoples.

39. Czechoslovakia has repeatedly expressed in the United Nations its principled and immutable position on the question of Cyprus. On 18 November 1983 the Czechoslovak Government issued a statement in connection with the proclamation of the so-called separate State of Cypriot Turks, to the effect that, among other things, this proclamation undermines the efforts for a just settlement of the problem, is in contravention of United Nations resolutions on the question of Cyprus and, in consequence, places in jeopardy the existence of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent State.

40. Czechoslovakia continues to support unequivocally an independent, sovereign, united, territorially integral and non-aligned Cyprus. At the same time it rejects any violation of the aforementioned principles and encourages the elimination of all possible factors having a negative impact on the development of the problem. Of principal importance, in our view, is the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus and the liquidation of the military bases in the island.

41. As the 20 April 1984 *communiqué* of the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty declares,

> "there are no issues that could not be resolved through talks, if they are conducted on the basis of a constructive approach and political will to attain positive results, with due regard for the vital interests of the peoples, the interests of peace and international security" [*see S/16504, annex*].

In Czechoslovakia's view, precisely this kind of approach is the key to a just settlement of the problem of Cyprus that would be in the interest of the Cypriot people and in the interest of strengthening peace and security in that region. It is, therefore, necessary to create, as soon as possible, conditions for the resumption of a constructive dialogue between the representatives of both Cypriot communities in accordance with

adopted United Nations resolutions. We are of the opinion that the Secretary-General should continue in the future to play an important role in these negotiations.

42. It may be said that this year will complete a decade in the present problem of Cyprus. We appeal to all interested parties to do their utmost to achieve a just settlement of the question of Cyprus before that decade reaches its end.

43. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): Mr. President, not long ago I had occasion to remark in relation to two of your predecessors, that the letter "P" obviously stood for "presidency", and that they had carried out their tasks very well. But you, Sir, are in a special position. I think that in your case—though not, I may say, in mine—the letter "U" stands for "uniquely well qualified". You are the dean of the Council. You have had more experience in the presidency than any of the rest of us and, if I may say so, it shows. Your Government's confidence in you is well deserved. Our thanks also go to your predecessor, the representative of the Ukraine, for his careful and diligent conduct of the presidency.

44. My delegation has listened to this debate with attention. We have done so in pursuance of our responsibilities as a member of the Security Council but also with a special knowledge and experience of the Cyprus problem. If I may say so, some of the contributions to this debate have not been altogether well focused. The situation is very complicated and has a long and convoluted history. This no doubt accounts for the fact that some statements, often with the best of intentions, have contained phrases which may actually be counterproductive to their authors' intentions.

45. In this statement I would like to put the problem before us into sharper focus. There is first the immediate problem raised in the letter dated 30 April 1984 from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council [*S/16514*]. That deals with the recent purported exchange of ambassadors, which is a subject in its own right. It has implications for the wider and more fundamental problems concerning the relationship of the two communities in Cyprus, the preservation of the Republic of Cyprus and a range of international relations connected with these questions. But it is necessary to make a distinction between the immediate problem of the purported exchange of ambassadors and the more fundamental long-term problems of the situation in Cyprus.

46. As regards the immediate problem, the substance seems to my delegation to be clear beyond dispute. Indeed, it is so clear that we had hoped that the Council would have passed a resolution on the question many meetings ago. Had that happened we would not have thought it necessary to make more than a very short speech or, indeed, perhaps any speech at all. We think there would have been a clear and overwhelming vote on the facts of the situation. My delegation was the author and sponsor of resolution 541 (1983). That resolution stated in unambiguous terms that the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 19 November 1983 purporting to create an independent State in northern Cyprus was incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus[1] and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.[2] The resolution considered that the declaration was legally invalid and would contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus. I think perhaps we could all agree that we were right in coming to that judgement. The resolution also called upon all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation.

47. It is beyond doubt that the action which is the subject of the 30 April letter from the representative of Cyprus is in contravention of resolution 541 (1983). It is also beyond doubt that it has exacerbated the situation.

48. As I have already said, this is a very simple factual situation on which the Council might well have passed a resolution several days ago. The debate, however, has strayed over a whole range of other questions. I accept that the flouting of resolution 541 (1983) has had a harmful effect on the wider questions, but in this Council we must be careful not to compound the damage by blundering around in a very delicate situation.

49. It has been common ground for a long time that there will be an improvement in the fundamental and long-term situation in Cyprus only if there are serious and timely negotiations directed at removing, perhaps step by step, all the points of disagreement so that the Republic of Cyprus may enjoy sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment. The fundamental document is of course the 1960 Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.

50. It is also common ground that the best—and, in the circumstances, perhaps the only—way of achieving this object is through the exercise of the good offices of the Secretary-General. Successive Secretaries-General have striven in this field. Agreements have been reached. I recall, for example, the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979. My Government considers that these principles remain fundamental. Our present Secretary-General, with his unique experience and knowledge of the problem, is ideally suited to bring about a comprehensive settlement. Council resolution 541 (1983) calls upon the authorities to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices.

51. We all subscribe to that. The problem is that some people take steps, some of them inadvertent, some of them intentional, which make the Secretary-General's task much harder. His report of 1 May 1984 [*S/16519*] is clear and convincing testimony to this. The risk is that we are now close to a situation in which such actions will make his task impossible. That is of great concern to my Government.

52. We well understand how, in the heat of the debate or as part of an unfortunate propaganda war, public statements are made which may later be regretted. But, although it is easy to understand, it is hard to condone. Still less can we condone the issuance of threats. It is essential that the parties to this dispute should talk to each other and that all of them should talk to the Secretary-General. We have heard some statements recently which suggest that one or other party is unwilling to do this. If these statements are maintained or if new obstacles are created, we all face the prospect of a deteriorating spiral of events with ever more serious consequences.

53. No party to this dispute has a monopoly of virtue. All parties have made mistakes. All parties have acted in contravention of agreements.

54. In short, while the immediate problem of the purported exchange of ambassadors is clear and simple, the longer-term and more fundamental problem of the situation in Cyprus is very complicated and is getting increasingly dangerous. The simplicities of one question are not to be applied to the complexities of the other. The long-term fundamental problem requires that all parties co-operate with the Secretary-General in the exercise of his good offices while in the meantime refraining from any action which might exacerbate the situation. That is the message which it is essential for the Council to issue in discharging its responsibilities for peace and security.

55. The Council should state its position firmly and persuasively while avoiding actions which would make a settlement more difficult. In our view it can best do this on the basis of certain fundamental principles which are not disputed by either of the parties and have the backing of the international community as a whole. These are: support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus; opposition to and non-recognition of the union of the Republic of Cyprus in whole or in part with any other country and/or any form of partition or secession, including the unilateral declaration of independence, by any part of the Republic; support for an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, federal Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the provisions of the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements; support for the continuation of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices, as authorized in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 367 (1975), with the objective of promoting, through the resumption of negotiations and in accordance with the above principles, a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem; belief that the main impetus must come from the parties, which should be in no doubt of the urgency of the task; and opposition to any action by anyone which might jeopardize the outcome of negotiations or increase tension in Cyprus.

56. Britain is ready, now as always, to play its full part in such an approach. We shall give every support to the Secretary-General and warmly welcome his willingness to continue with his mission. We call on the parties to co-operate with him and respond constructively to his efforts. Only if they do so will a peaceful, just and lasting solution become possible.

57. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: Mr. Rauf Denktaş, to whom the Council extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure at the 2531st meeting, wishes to make a further statement. With the consent of the Council, I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make that statement.

58. Mr. DENKTAŞ: Members need not be concerned by the many documents I have brought with me. I shall not be reading them all out; they are merely for moral support in this lonely atmosphere.

59. I have listened to the arguments of the Greek Cypriot side, and now I understand very well why, when they are heard in our absence, they obtain the votes. They have said quite openly that the Turkish Cypriot side is guilty of segregation, of dividing the sovereignty of Cyprus—and I think I was referred to as the Ian Smith of Cyprus. I can understand how such a presentation affects the African nations. They have also stated quite openly—in writing and verbally—that if what we did in Cyprus is condoned all nations with multiple populations will have a precedent for splitting up, and the Charter will have been defied and defiled.

60. Such a presentation in the absence of one of the component parts of a sovereign country, of a *sui generis* independent country, is naturally very effective. That is why in all my statements here I have tried—by the Council's leave and as a person under its rules—to tell members the story, the plight and the cause of my community.

61. In response to those who try to equate me with the Ian Smith of the African continent, I ask my African brothers to consider whether, had Ian Smith represented the majority in the land and it had had a constitution stating that the whites and the blacks would form a partnership State, that one side would not override the other and the constitution would be respected, he would have been quite right and entitled under the Charter and in accordance with human rights to proceed, because he had a numerical majority, secretly to arm his police and his young people. Would he have been right one night to attack the blacks and throw them out and keep them outside the constitution and all the organs of the State, to decide that they were all rebels and to keep them in that position fighting for their lives, their territory and their homes for 20 years without being entitled to put the currency of the country in their pocket, without being entitled to cry for justice when they were hurt and murdered, without being entitled to say we are part of this land?

62. Was Ian Smith guilty of sinning against this or that part of the Charter and against humanity just be-

cause he represented the minority and did those things, or would he have been guilty had he represented the majority and had done the same things to the co-founding partners of a joint State? If our dear African brothers and representatives are seeking Ian Smith in Cyprus, let them look to the Greek Cypriot side. Because the Greek Cypriots were numerically many they decided that they could destroy a partnership Republic, a partnership State; it was not a Greek Cypriot State, I repeat. They secretly armed themselves, they invited the Greek army to the island, at first secretly and then openly, and they maintained their attacks on us for 11 years, until 1974. And in self-defence we took preventive, protective measures.

63. I am not saying that we are angels; but we are not the devils they want members to think we are.

64. Now that I have seen the draft resolution that has been distributed and the countries that have sponsored it, I understand that my message has not been heard; I understand that something is lacking. What is lacking is the right to be heard on a basis of equality by those who decide the fate and the lives of others. We have not asked anything more of the Council. We have asked to be heard, but we have not been heard. Had we been asked what this draft resolution would do to us, we would have told you that it would kill the good offices mission of the Secretary-General, which members of the Council want to be continued, which the Greek Cypriots say they need and which we believe to be really necessary. So let us put our heads together and come up with a draft resolution that will be helpful for Cyprus as a whole.

65. Segregation we deny. *Apartheid* we reject. It is not segregation in the circumstances I have just explained, when, after being treated like that, after waiting 20 years for rehabilitation in a partnership State with our full rights, we are told that unless we accept that the Greek Cypriot word is the constitution of the country, unless we accept that we are not a co-founder partner but a minority in a Greek Cyprus, we are not going to come back into any of the organs of the State.

66. Would any member that had been confronted with that situation for 20 years be guilty of segregation if it said, "The land in which we can be happy, live in human dignity and be free should be ours until the other side comes to its senses and decides to re-establish the partnership"? Would it be guilty of segregation or should it be proud of taking this step in order to save its people from harassment, from a policy of destruction, from *apartheid*? That is what I ask the Council to consider. If members have any doubt in their minds I invite them to come to Cyprus to see for themselves and then decide.

67. Another matter on which the other side dwelt very strongly, and with which I understand they have influenced those who contributed to the draft resolution, was an alleged statement in *Hurriyet*, attributed to me, about Varosha. When I make a statement, I make a statement; I do not deny having made it and I explain why I made it. I said that *Hurriyet* version only after it was pointed out to me by the speaker on the other side. I did not make any such statement. I made another statement, but that is irrelevant.

68. My offer of 2 January 1984 on Varosha stands. It is there on the table. In that offer Varosha is a matter to be discussed between my side and the Secretary-General. We are ready to do that, but if the Council puts the question of Varosha in the context in which the Greek Cypriots see it into a resolution, that will destroy that effort. Varosha is a municipal matter. It concerns a part of a little town, in return for which other properties have been left in the south. It is far below the interests of the Security Council. The Council should not be alarmed because it is told something and try to put everything into a resolution, which will not help the Secretary-General but which will destroy his efforts.

69. Another matter on which they challenged us and challenged the Security Council was the question of UNFICYP. UNFICYP is very important, of course. It is so important that when the other side were strong enough, in 1967, to attack the Turkish Cypriots, they first disarmed UNFICYP. It is in the reports of the Secretary-General. They imprisoned them, ridiculed them and attacked and killed unarmed Turkish Cypriot people, in two villages. And, not wanting to spend valuable bullets on the wounded, they poured kerosene on them and burned them.

70. Of course, UNFICYP is important. All the major crimes against us were committed when UNFICYP was told, "We, the Government, are going to attack. Withdraw." Our only hope was that UNFICYP reported to New York. Our only hope was that the Security Council would say "Stop" to Makarios. That is how we were saved, so we know the value of UNFICYP.

71. Why, then, did we not concur with the last resolution on the extension of its mandate? We explained then, but let me explain again now: When a Government which has thrown us out of our part of the constitution, which has taken over the seat of Government by armed force, which for years and years has recognized no law, no constitution, no international treaty, no human rights, for my community, is referred to as "the Government", we object.

72. So, if the other side are really sincere about UNFICYP, can we not find a mutually agreed wording of a resolution which will extend UNFICYP's term of office, and mutually agreed terms of reference for the parties to the Cyprus conflict? Would that not suffice in order to carry on this very important peace-keeping task in Cyprus? Why use UNFICYP in order to rub into our wounded skins the word "Government" in each resolution? Could we not have some resolutions in which, because of the mutual interests of the parties, we could manoeuvre a little in order to accommodate

each other, the United Nations, the Security Council and UNFICYP? Of course we could, but that is not the purpose. The purpose is always to drive us into a corner so that we retaliate, and then to bring us back here and tell the Council what we have done. This game will continue until the Turkish community is properly executed by the decisions of the international body.

73. This is the aim. What they have not been able to achieve by guns they want to achieve through the resolutions of the Council, because they know that the Council does not have the time to stand, to look, to listen and to decide whether those who are talking to it as "the Government" of Cyprus are truly the representatives of the peoples of Cyprus. That is what they base their strategy on.

74. So on UNFICYP, which we will come to within a few weeks, I suggest that we find brief, neutral phraseology, a few paragraphs, to extend its mandate. Then it will be legally located on both parts of the country. We have been accused of not concurring with the extension of UNFICYP's mandate last time because we had other aims in mind and wanted to create a crisis. I think we have proved that not to be correct by agreeing that UNFICYP continue its functions in the north more liberally than ever. There are no complaints whatsoever about our relations with UNFICYP.

75. So we have given the Security Council the chance to decide whether it is important, when extending the mandate of UNFICYP, to include the words "the Government of Cyprus", and thus put us into the corner, or whether it is important to extend the mandate with the agreement of both sides. If the words "the Government" are not included in that resolution, is it going to become less a Government than it is? If our name is not included in that resolution, are we going to be anything less than we are? We must accommodate each other if we are mutually interested in one and the same result.

76. I tell the Council with all deference that we are interested in UNFICYP's continuing its functions in Cyprus. We think it is necessary, we think it is doing a good job, and we think it should be in both parts of the island—legally, and therefore with our consent. The Council should not put its own force at a disadvantage just because one side insists on repeating words which it knows are unacceptable to the other side. They will lose nothing, we will gain nothing, but UNFICYP will be a legal institution in both parts. Those are my views on this matter.

77. Yesterday [*2537th meeting*] I sat here listening to the representative of the Greek Cypriot side and it occurred to me that the saying "exceptions prove the rule" is of great value and practical application. I told the Council in my previous statement [*2534th meeting*], quoting the Secretary-General's reports, that the Turkish members of the civil service were thrown out by force of arms and because of the military situation they could not go back; that members of Parliament were thrown out and could not go back. The representative of the Greek Cypriot side, in order to refute those charges, mentioned that about 35 people, years later, under a special agreement with certain United Nations agencies and with the consent of their side and of ours, had taken up work on their side. So the exception he has cited proves the rule. We were thrown out; we were not allowed back.

78. And, while that was the situation of the civil servants and the parliamentarians, the Council was told that the three Turkish Ministers had withdrawn in order to show that the Republic was dead. If the Council accepts that, I have nothing to say.

79. I look to the Greek side, sitting here in the Council, for some signs of appreciation of the fact that reconciliation can come only if they accept that they did wrong in the past, that they tried to destroy the bicommunal Republic of Cyprus in the name of *enosis*. If they should say, "In that exercise we hurt the Turks immensely; we ejected them. There is no shame in it; it was a national cause." If it is not still a national cause, they should say, "We were misled by our leader Makarios, by Greece. We took a wrong decision. It was wrong to destroy this partnership. Let us go back to the partnership."

80. There is an agreement, as has been pointed out by a number of representatives, to re-establish that partnership in a bi-zonal, federal way. Are we still in favour of it? I ask this question of the representatives who have sponsored the draft resolution. If there is acceptance of the 1977 and 1979 summit agreements, if the aim is still a bi-zonal, federal republic with the Turkish Cypriots, why is it, and how is it, that this is not mentioned in the draft resolution? Why did the Greek Cypriots not include it in their draft resolution, on which the Council's draft is founded? Why is it that in the General Assembly they mentioned everything except these agreements? Is it because they think they have convinced enough Members and they can now get away with Cyprus as a Greek Cypriot land? How would any member like an Ian Smith to get his country as his own because of the mistaken decisions of the Security Council or the General Assembly? Would that member bow to such decisions, or would he feel it to be an honour to stand up and continue campaign of enlightenment in order to prove to the well-intentioned people who have been misinformed that what they are doing is wrong—wrong in the light of the Charter, wrong in the light of the law? That is what we are doing. We are not defying Security Council decisions; we are, I repeat, too small to defy the Security Council or any other body. But, like all men of dignity, we are strong enough to fight for our rights, for our liberty and for the re-establishment of a partnership republic in Cyprus.

81. This republic must be closed to *enosis*, to partition. That is our offer. That this republic must not be a Greek Cypriot republic is the case history of the whole problem. The problem was put on the Council's agenda

when a partnership republic was destroyed. That is why it is there. The Cyprus problem was not put on the Council's agenda because Turkey came to Cyprus. Turkey came to Cyprus in order to save the partnership republic. As for the non-aligned world, which thinks that we are against it or do not accept its principles, I ask it to understand—and I do so in honour, proudly—that had we not fought there would not today be a non-aligned Cyprus. That is so simple, and so true. Had we not fought, Cyprus as an independent, non-aligned State would have disappeared long ago.

82. Another matter I want to touch upon very briefly is the statement made yesterday by the representative of southern Cyprus to the effect that judges continued to function until 1966 and that they withdrew as a result of, again, of course, Turkey's intervention. If Greek Cypriots would stop seeing Turkey under every stone in the Turkish sector, they would start seeing Turkish Cypriots for what they are: Turkish Cypriots, born in Cyprus, who have lived for centuries in Cyprus, who have never submitted to Greek Cypriot rule, who were always equal as one of two different communities, who established with them the Republic of Cyprus and who have been fighting for 20 years now to prevent Greek Cypriots from taking the Republic of Cyprus, the State of Cyprus, into the fold of Greece, which they claim to be their national cause.

83. I will now read out to the Council a statement by the Turkish judges published on 28 February 1980, in News Bulletin No. 3716, in reply to Mr. Justice Triandafilides, who had alleged more or less the same thing as a propaganda gesture: "The Turkish Cypriot judges attended the courts till 2 June 1966"—after the 1963 events there was a lull; then they attended the courts because there was a Canadian chief justice who came and implored us to help retain some contact; otherwise justice would not be done, because in all courts, in mixed cases, there had to be mixed judges, and in order to show that what we wanted was to go back to our constitutional rights, in a revised form of course, and to protect our own people, we went back and the judges said that they left because they had to—

> "through the efforts of the then neutral President of the High Court, Mr. Wilson, on the understanding that the provisions of the Constitution would be restored and hoping that discrimination against the Turkish community would be prevented. But, to our regret, during the two-year period when Turkish judges attended the courts"—most of them had to be escorted to the courts and back to the Turkish area because they were in fear for their lives—"not only were the provisions of the Constitution not restored, but the unconstitutional law mentioned above was used as an instrument to persecute the members of the Turkish community. The courts were turned into a star chamber. Turkish citizens were arrested, brought before the courts on fictitious charges such as preparing warlike operations, refused bail and kept in custody for long periods without being brought to trial. Turkish citizens were sentenced to pay fines of 50 to 200 for carrying a genuinely innocent letter from one village to another."

That was because postal services had been disrupted; we could give many such examples.

> "All these cases were taken before Greek judges, in violation of the Constitution, although Turkish judges were available; on the other hand, the Greeks who attacked or even murdered Turks were not even brought before the courts. Those who were brought for minor charges were later set scot-free or treated very leniently on the pretext of being members of the legal forces of the State."

And legal forces of the State meant an illegal establishment called the National Guard.

> "As judges, we shall never forget the day when, on 2 June 1966, we were stopped at the check-point near the law courts. Some of us were prevented from attending the courts, and one of us, who had managed to get through, was removed from his chambers at gun-point and taken back to the check-point."

This is reality, but the fiction, it appears, is more acceptable when it comes from people who have the label of the Government on them.

84. I have listened with due care, attention and respect to what has been said by the speakers. Everybody says that the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Cyprus are very important. Of course they are. We have said it is because that territorial integrity was not protected by the Greek Cypriots, who attacked us in order to destroy it and hand it over to Greece, that what has happened has happened. We are ready to go back to territorial integrity in a federal form. We are at the table; we never left the table. They left the table, contrary to advice from the Secretary-General. They resorted to the General Assembly.

85. It was the General Assembly's latest resolution, resolution 37/253 of May 1983—which certain Members have proudly said they voted for—which disregarded our rights, which disregarded history, which disregarded what the Greek Cypriot administration had done to the Turkish Cypriots over the years and which gave them the title deed to Cyprus free of charge, contrary to our existence and contrary to our wishes. It is that achievement which made the Greek party leaders who had attended that meeting go back shouting victory; it pointed out to us that the world organization was on the wrong path and that we would not be heard unless and until we made some movement; that we would be eroded from Cyprus unless we showed the world that we meant business in defending our rights and our liberties—in defending Cyprus.

86. That is how we came to the establishment of the State, in self-defence, but I still see that the same

approach is being made by some members who refuse to look back, who refuse to say, all right, we are treating the people who keep the seat of Cyprus as the Government of Cyprus, but we know there is something wrong, therefore all we shall do is to tell them to go and talk at the negotiating table if they are sincere and want to re-establish a partnership republic with these people.

87. This is not said. The Government is important; the territorial integrity of Cyprus is important; the sovereignty of Cyprus is important; the independence of Cyprus is important. With due respect, we think we also are important, because without us there is no territorial integrity—it becomes Greek territory. Without our participation in all organs of the State and in the new form, in all organs of the federal Government, there is no Government, there is no independence.

88. If we refuse to allow Cyprus to become a Greek colony and if over the years our struggle has given no result because of misconceptions in the world, we had to do something to save ourselves from erosion. If the Council understands this, it will be helping us; it will be helping Cyprus. But as long as it does not understand this it will maintain the position that the Greek Cypriots are the Government of Cyprus and it does not matter whether for 20 years they had nothing to do with Turkish Cypriots except attack them, ill-treat them, deny them their rights, change the Constitution by word of mouth, expect Turks to become a minority in a Greek Cyprus; it does not matter how many people were killed in order to reduce the Turks to the position of a minority; it does not matter that the Turks had to invite Turkey as a guaranteeing Power in order to prevent a take-over of the island by Greece; all of that is irrelevant; they can keep the seat of Government; they are the Government and therefore whatever these little Turks do, we must condemn them; we must punish them.

89. We wish to see some condemnation of what has been done and what is still being done to us for 20 years—no rights, no position, no status, no State, and the Council is asking me to continue for perhaps another 20 years in that position. Why? Because if I do not I will be defying the Security Council.

90. I have no intention whatsoever of defying the Security Council resolutions, none whatsoever, but I have no intention of leaving my community in the cold just because the Greek Cypriots will not abandon that seat where my share is still visible to me and I see it as stolen. I say I am as much a Cypriot as he is. I want my right there, and I want my security provided for, too. That is only natural after what has happened to me. That is our case.

91. As I believe the draft resolution will be introduced officially later—and I hope I shall be given the right to say what I think about it and how we shall act with regard to it—I shall not prolong this statement. I repeat with all good will my call for co-operation, which was made in these words:

> "Let us work with determination towards a final compromise and reconciliation. Let us direct our efforts towards positive ends and steadily proceed on that course. Let us abandon negative attitudes geared toward destroying each other. Let us not forget that others cannot take decisions on behalf of the two peoples of Cyprus, and that only through our own efforts, treading the same path together and helping each other, shall we be able to proceed towards a federal solution."

92. I therefore invite the Greek Cypriots once again to tread with us the same constructive and peaceful path by passing through the door we are still holding open for them. If they walk through that door, we shall end in a bi-zonal partnership State. Do they want it? Do they look at us as partners, as equals, or do they not? If they do not, let us not waste the Council's time and the Secretary-General's time. If they do, the Council will find us more than ever eager to help establish this bi-zonal federal republic.

93. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The representative of Cyprus has asked to speak, and I call upon him to do so.

94. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): I had hoped that the representative of Turkey would make at least a credible attempt to reply to the fully documented statement by my Foreign Minister yesterday. Instead, he again chose, in the usual fashion, to place Mr. Denktaş at the forefront, to rehash unsubstantiated statements and repeated allegations which can no longer stand scrutiny by the Council.

95. In a previous statement by my delegation I said, among other things, that should the Turkish Cypriot community be set free the world would witness one of the most moving scenes of reunion among countrymen with a common destiny and country. This is my Government's policy. However, this reference to unity and the bonds of common destiny of our people, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, caused Mr. Denktaş high blood pressure and almost an outburst, so that, as he admits, he had to leave the Council chamber. Beyond the candidness of his statement, no words of his could have demonstrated more effectively his hatred of, and aversion to, the unity and peaceful co-operation of our communities.

96. When I spoke of the common bonds and destiny of our Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, I did not, of course, wish Mr. Denktaş harm. On the contrary, I hope that he is alive to see the proof of the wise saying that water runs to water and man to man. He will see his policies of separation and partition tumble and his policies of hatred discarded in the waste basket. For no man and no power in the world can stop the natural course of unity against which he has fought consistently, all his life, in spite of some parts of his statement today.

97. Many statements of the Turkish representative and Mr. Denktaş have again revolved around the question of *enosis*. For every quotation on *enosis* which they can produce, I can quote an equal number of Turkish statements on *taqsim*—that is, the partition of Cyprus. Let me simply quote Mr. Denktaş himself, who said on 11 August 1977, according to the weekly magazine *Soz*: "We said Cyprus is Turkish and shall remain Turkish." On 24 March 1978 he was again quoted in *Soz* as saying: "Let them brand me a chauvinist. I spoke openly. Unless this Turkish community integrates and unites with its motherland, the Cyprus problem will not reach a solution."

98. As to Mr. Denktaş's credibility—I would say "credibility gap"—*Soz* also wrote, on 15 November 1978:

> "Rauf Denktaş's past and his present domestic policy nullify the credibility of his statements. The world and particularly the non-aligned countries"—to which Mr. Denktaş referred today—"do not intend to forget Denktaş's past policy for partition and unification with Turkey. Nobody will seriously believe those who take bills providing for integration with the motherland to the Assembly at home and who talk about independence abroad."

How right that is. They did not believe him then, and they will not believe him today.

99. It is no secret that the self-determination claimed by the Cypriots during the colonial years aimed at *enosis*. It was neither sinister nor secret. Cypriots placed this item before the General Assembly, and the records of the General Assembly are there to prove both that demand for *enosis* and, equally important, the candidness of the claim.

100. But what about today? It is the epitome of misinformation when statements on *enosis* made by the Turkish side avoid reference to the present, and specifically to two solemn resolutions of the Cyprus House of Representatives, of 20 September 1979 and 2 October 1981, which absolutely reject any solution which would abolish the independent Republic of Cyprus or annex the whole or part of its territory to any other State. The Government of Cyprus stands by those resolutions. Furthermore, the high-level agreement of 1979 between President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktaş rules out *enosis*, secession and partition.

101. As to his questions about the high-level agreements, my answer is that, yes, we stand by the 1977 and 1979 agreements. Has the Turkish side honoured them? Of course it has not. They proceeded with the unilateral declaration of independence, they exchanged ambassadors, and they are contemplating other illegal actions for the complete partition and eventual annexation by Turkey of the occupied part. They have undermined these agreements at their roots.

102. Mr. Denktaş spoke about an imaginary *coup*, and about the Turkish Cypriot community being deprived of its rights. Where is the *coup*? The then President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the State and remove certain causes of international friction in a democratic way, transmitted a 13-point memorandum to the then Vice-President Küçük, a Turkish Cypriot, for his consideration. The latter promised to consider it. These points suggested the revision of certain articles of the Constitution which, owing to their separatist nature, impeded the smooth functioning of the Government and tended to keep the two communities apart instead of drawing them together in a spirit of co-operation and understanding. The proposals aimed at the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole.

103. Because of this 13-point proposal, Turkey found a pretext, however, to set its sinister plans once again in motion. Turkey organized and carried out Ankara's plan for undermining the newly established Republic of Cyprus through acts of insurrection against the Government and outright terrorism against members of the Turkish community who believed in the coexistence and co-operation of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. The cold-blooded murder on 11 April 1965 of the Turkish Cypriot Kavazoglou and the Greek Cypriot Mishaoulis—two people dedicated to the common destiny of and co-operation between our communities—is a striking example of the inhuman means employed for the purpose of suppressing any contacts or friendship between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

104. Mr. Denktaş accused the Government of not having shown flexibility on the solution of the problem. That is an outrageous allegation. The sad truth is that we made painful concessions. We accepted negotiations while the occupation troops were in Cyprus even though the resolutions provided for prior withdrawal of those Turkish troops. We accepted a federal solution of the problem even though our position had all along been in favour of a unitary State. No sooner had we accepted the federation than the Turkish side came up with another demand: for a bi-regional federation. Painfully but sincerely we accepted it in order to bring to an end the agonizing suffering of our people. But, alas, we have recently heard the voice of Turkey speaking about a "bi-national, bi-zonal federation", meaning that there are two peoples, two nations, in Cyprus, and that, according to an interpretation given by Mr. Denktaş himself, "The two partner peoples who will form the federation will live in their respective areas and under the administration of their own federated States."

105. This interpretation distorts both the letter and the spirit of the Makarios-Denktaş agreement of 1977. That agreement referred to areas which would be under the administration of each community, but at no point did it say that the area under Greek Cypriot administration would be inhabited solely by Greek Cypriots and the area under Turkish Cypriot administration would be

inhabited solely by Turkish Cypriots. That the interpretation given by Mr. Denktaş is arbitrary is evident also from references in the agreement to principles such as those of freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property. The creation in a State of two areas that would be inhabited by citizens solely on the basis of their racial origin is contrary to every human rights convention. It is a form of *apartheid*, and the Government of Cyprus cannot accept it. Will the exponents of segregation, division and *apartheid* sell it to the international community? I strongly believe they will not.

106. Mr. Denktaş complained about the United Nations resolutions and, especially, about positions taken by the non-aligned countries on the question of Cyprus. In other words, he told us that the whole international community and especially the non-aligned countries are out of their minds for supporting the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-aligned status of Cyprus and for branding his puppet régime as legally invalid. The whole world is at fault, according to him, because it does not agree with him and because no self-respecting country recognizes the offspring of the genocidal expulsion of indigenous peoples. Self-respect, apparently, is not a virtue which he appreciates.

107. I believe that on this subject an article published on 3 September 1979 in the Turkish daily *Aidinlyk* hits the nail on the head. It states the following:

> "The Cyprus resolutions taken by the non-aligned countries are in complete harmony with the basic principles of the Non-Aligned Movement. National independence and respect for a country's sovereignty top these principles. By Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus have been destroyed. Could it be expected that the non-aligned would support the intervention by accepting this situation?"

108. Mr. Denktaş spoke about the 1960 Constitution. I put a question to him. Does he accept the 1960 Constitution? My President made the position of the Government very clear in last year's General Assembly.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

NOTES

[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5476.
[2] *Ibid.*, No. 5475.

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